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Abstract
Existing accounts of failure to predict the financial crisis focus on the complexity
of the financial system, and are less useful for understanding crises in non-secur-
itized markets. We examine the roots of optimism leading up to the Eastern Euro-
pean mortgage crisis through the case of Hungary, and use recent theories of
expectations, which understand them as both pragmatic and fictional practices
that commonly incorporate narratives. Based on archival research and interviews
with bankers, regulators and legislators, we demonstrate how the EU convergence
narrative was central in forming optimistic expectations. Fusing the underspeci-
fied convergence process with an orientalist geographical imaginary, this narrative
and its associated measures translated growing indebtedness as ‘catching up’ with
Europe, de-emphasized exchange rate risk through a belief in European conver-
gence and precluded crisis scenarios originating in the European Union. Our find-
ings contribute to theories of how economic expectations are formed, stabilized
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and maintained by developing the concept of ‘spatializing the future’, denoting
practices that handle uncertainty by charting the future as movement in concrete
geographical or abstract space, along externally verifiable pathways.
Keywords: expectations; mortgage markets; foreign-currency lending; future;
Hungary; financial crisis.
Those planning to take out a long-term loan can safely choose foreign-currency-
based products because it is unlikely that an exchange rate change that would sig-
nificantly increase repayments would occur during the term of the loan…Thus,
there is no need to be scared that households taking out loans in foreign currency
would incur losses due to the exchange rate risk. (Hungarian Banking Associ-
ation cited in MTI, 2006)
Between 2003 and 2010, the Hungarian mortgage market experienced a spec-
tacular fourfold growth from $3.6 billion to $14.4 billion (Schepp & Pitz, 2012).
The growth was fuelled by foreign-currency-denominated mortgages (hence-
forth: Forex mortgages). These could be obtained at substantially lower interest
rates than Hungarian forint loans, but they were repayable in forint at the
current exchange rate. As the US financial crisis reached Europe, the forint
plummeted. Monthly payments on Forex mortgages grew by as much as 80–
90 per cent,1 and defaults soared. Similar crises swept through the region,
causing what some in central banking referred to as the Eastern European
equivalent of the sub-prime mortgage crisis.2
In recent years, a substantial literature has emerged on why economic actors
did not see the US and UK sub-prime crisis coming, and found the core cause
in the securitized markets’ intractable complexity. The ‘toxic’ mortgages of the
Eastern European region, however, were neither securitized nor sub-prime:
Swiss franc mortgages were lent out largely to middle-class borrowers and
were kept on banks’ books. Unlike the chains of mortgage securitization,
foreign-currency lending was a transaction that banks and regulators, at least
for the most part, understood.
This ‘simple crisis’ compels us to ask why actors did not see it coming.
Specifically, what were the sources of optimistic expectations of key institutional
actors about mortgages in the period leading up to the crisis? In this paper, we
examine this question through the case of Hungary, one of the worst-hit
countries of the region. We focus on one source of optimistic expectations
that our research revealed as particularly pertinent: the European convergence
narrative.
Focusing on expectations is not alternative, but complementary to economic
geography and political economy accounts, according to which the Central and
Eastern European (CEE) mortgage expansion was driven by high interest rates
in the (semi)periphery, allowing high margins for subsidiaries of Western-
European banks and cheap loans for local borrowers (Smith & Swain, 2010).
Interest rate differentials did exist; however, to interpret them as signals of
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profitable opportunities (Vollmer, 2016), actors had to form optimistic expec-
tations about the future. As Beckert (2013b) argues, expectations are the ‘micro-
foundations of political economy’ (p. 323).
Analysing these expectations, we show that they were based on a narrative of
European convergence, which translated the uncertain future into a seemingly
certain spatial trajectory leading towards the European Union. This narrative
allowed actors to interpret growing indebtedness as a sign of ‘catching up’ ( fel-
zárkózás) to the more developed Europe and precluded scenarios of a crisis
originating there. We argue that this narrative did not simply acknowledge
the ongoing EU and future Eurozone accession process. Rather, it tackled
uncertainty by mobilizing the older, developmentalist Westernization narrative
prevalent in the region. The convergence narrative fell back on the developmen-
talist narrative’s tropes when uncertainty arose; and it was the developmentalist
narrative’s legacy that lent the convergence narrative legitimacy and power to
withstand contradicting information.
Our findings contribute, firstly, to the scholarship on the failure to predict
the global financial crisis by extending the focus of analysis to the foreign-cur-
rency mortgage crises outside the Western core. Secondly, theoretically, we
contribute to the literature on how expectations are formed and maintained in
the economy, building on previous work examining the role of narratives in
this process (Beckert, 2013b, 2016; Chong & Tuckett, 2015; Esposito, 2011).
We develop the concept of ‘spatializing the future’, which refers to expec-
tation-formation practices that chart the future as a movement through space
along locations of a moral cartography. Further, we show its role in legitimizing,
maintaining and sharing expectations across a set of economic actors in the
market.
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we start with an over-
view of ‘knowledge failures’ (Bryan et al., 2012, p. 301) in predicting the finan-
cial crisis, and move on to theories on the formation of expectations more
broadly. We bring a different set of theories, developed originally for under-
standing spatial hierarchies and the European convergence programme, to
bear on the question of expectation-formation. After introducing our archival
and interview methods, and the Hungarian case, we present our findings, detail-
ing how spatialized expectations of a European convergence narrative contrib-
uted to a favourable outlook on the growth of mortgage lending. In the
concluding section, we discuss the implications of spatial narratives for the
crisis and for the formation of economic expectations.
Economic expectations and imagined geographies
Foreseeing the unforeseeable: predicting the future in the economy
The question of why actors did not foresee the global financial crisis has been
overwhelmingly framed as a problem of knowledge, in particular, of
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predictability and techniques of knowing the complex, securitized sub-prime
market (Bryan et al., 2012; Langley, 2008a, 2008b). According to one set of
arguments, the specific models used prevented predicting such an event.
Models excluded low-likelihood ‘Black Swan’ events (Taleb, 2007); were
forged from multiple evaluation cultures (MacKenzie, 2012); had problematic
assumptions such as rising home prices (Goldstein & Fligstein, 2014; MacKen-
zie & Spears, 2014); and did not capture the complexity of economic life
(Langley, 2008a, 2008b). The second set of explanations suggested that knowl-
edge became selective due to passive ignorance from information overload gen-
erated by transparency requirements (Dorn, 2012), ‘strategic ignorance’ of
known facts (Davies & McGoey, 2012; McGoey, 2012), technocrats’ detach-
ment from the bricolage of financial innovation (Engelen et al., 2012) or collec-
tive calculative behaviour through which oversight was amplified (Beunza &
Stark, 2012). In a third set of accounts, incentive structures encouraged
short-term calculation of self-interest despite knowledge of danger (Engelen
et al., 2012). Finally, arguments about the ‘pretence of knowledge’ suggested
that disaster arose from risk-based finance and monetary policy overstating its
capacity to predict the inherently uncertain future (Beckert, 2013b; Braun,
2015; Engelen et al., 2012; Langley, 2008b).
These explanations, largely focusing on knowability and its constraints,
emphasize the complexity of innovative financial products and of a burgeoning
financial system. However, they offer only partial answers to crises which orig-
inate in rather standard risks: mortgage default risk and exchange rate risk.
To understand crises in which the complexity of products or of the financial
system is not a key driver, we return to the general question of how expectations
of the future are formed in the economy. The central paradox, as Braun
explains, is that economic action is future-oriented, yet the future is not know-
able. To make action possible, ‘defuturizing’ techniques are employed
(Luhmann, 1976; cited in Braun, 2015, p. 368), which bring the future into
the present, into something familiar and, ultimately, actionable.
The sociology of finance has mostly focused on the properties of risk as a key
defuturizing technique, using Knight’s distinction (1921) between calculable
risk and inherently unpredictable uncertainty – that element of the future
which cannot be transformed into risk through probabilistic calculative pro-
cedures.3 Drawing on O’Malley and Beckert, we cut across this distinction by
using the notion of expectations. For O’Malley (2000), expectations fall
between calculated risks and unknowable uncertainty as ‘specific forms of
common sense associated with pragmatic business reasoning – forms that
render the future “foreseeable” but not necessarily “calculable”’, encompassing
a contingent set of shared assumptions and practices ‘distinct from both statisti-
cal and expert-based calculation’ (p. 461)… ‘derived from imageries of entre-
preneurial calculation’ (p. 478). Expectations are also central to Beckert’s
(2013a, 2013b, 2016) seminal work on ‘fictional expectations’ in the economy.
Using Knight’s concept of uncertainty, Beckert suggests that expectations are
always ‘fictional’ – not in the sense of being arbitrary, but in the sense of
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containing an inescapable interpretive element. Without fictional expectations,
economic action would not be possible under conditions of uncertainty
(Beckert, 2013a; Esposito, 2011).
Beckert argues that focusing solely on calculative practices misses the point
that these calculations rely on assumptions about ‘an imagined future state of
the world’ (Beckert, 2013b, p. 220; see also Esposito, 2011). This also applies
to risk assessment and to building lenders’ confidence, which ‘must be
created and maintained through discursive processes’ (Beckert, 2016, p. 129).
Therefore, in this paper, we take a step back from dissecting forecasting
models, and inquire into the fictional expectations that made calculation of
the future possible.
We draw on prior research that highlights narratives as one of the fundamen-
tal ways of creating and maintaining fictional expectations across the economy
(Beckert, 2013b; Czarniawska, 1997; Mützel, 2013). These narratives tell
‘how the future will look and how the economy will unfold into the future
from the current state of affairs’ (Beckert, 2016, p. 10). Even point forecasts
are based on narratives as
[u]nderlying any imaginary of a specific future state is a story of how the present
will be transformed into the depicted future through causally linked steps… .
Stories provide causal links to show how the gap between the present state of
the world and the predicted future state will be closed. (Beckert, 2016, p. 69)
Chong and Tuckett (2015, p. 309) suggests that ‘conviction narratives’ instil
conviction about the future through emotionally arousing ideas that help dispel
doubt. In the extreme, ‘phantastic objects’ help maintain conviction by creating
‘a divided state’ (Tuckett et al., 2014, p. 121) of mind, which allows individuals
to ignore contradicting information (Chong & Tuckett, 2015; Tuckett et al.,
2014). Related research has identified further cultural dynamics of producing
conviction in expectations and maintaining them in the face of doubt.
Boccara (2014, p. 33) suggests that ‘shared idealized representations’ of a
nation impede decision-makers from acknowledging warning signs that contra-
dict them. Pelkmans (2017), in contrast, argues that doubt is crucial for convic-
tion to be maintained: ideas that need to be defended against doubt – as opposed
to taken-for-granted ideas – are the most likely to motivate action. Doubt pro-
duces ‘productive tension’ (Pelkmans, 2017, p. 175), which, rather than under-
mining belief, allows it to gain and maintain traction.
Moving the focus to the institutional embeddedness of expectations, ethno-
graphic studies of regulators and banks shows how forecasting depends on insti-
tutional interpretations of models and data (Zaloom, 2009) and how these
interpretations may be entrenched in specific institutional interests (Abolafia,
2004, 2010; Davies & McGoey, 2012). Interpretative schemes shared by mul-
tiple institutional actors, in turn, allow these schemes to gain legitimacy and
to dispel doubt about decisions informed by them (Bronk & Jacoby, 2016;
Engelen et al., 2012). Inquiring into the processes that make such sharing
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possible, Braun (2015), for example, shows how the communication between the
European Central Bank and banks helped perform ‘rational’ expectations.
Complementing the focus on human cognitive, emotional and interpretive
processes, the Social Studies of Finance highlights that calculating and planning
the future has a socio-technical dimension (e.g. Beunza & Stark, 2004). Expec-
tations are practical accomplishments and concrete instantiations of the future,
materialized in plans and scenarios through planning tools (Andersson et al.,
2015; Giraudeau, 2008).4 Based on studies of marketization, we can conceive
of expectations as a set of practical and situated activities involving
distributed cognition and concrete technologies or devices (Callon &
Muniesa, 2005; Hutchins, 1995; MacKenzie & Spears, 2014). It is through par-
ticular devices that institution-specific, as well as shared, expectations
materialize.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that to understand how optimistic
expectations were possible in a market, one must examine how expectations –
conceived as pragmatic, imagined, yet material amalgams of calculation and
narrative – were formed and maintained by multiple institutional actors.
Mapping the future through space: imagined geographies
To situate expectations about foreign-currency mortgages in the Eastern
European setting, we mobilize theories of orientalism applied to Eastern
Europe, hitherto disconnected from the sociology of the future scholarship.
This literature focuses on how geographic imaginaries naturalized the relation-
ships of domination between what they constructed as East and West. See-
mingly unrelated to the question of how expectations are formed, this body
of work brings an important new dimension, as it identifies narratives that,
first, endow geographical space with symbolic meaning and, second, chart the
future as a movement of ‘development’ between these spatial categories.
The moral classificatory system that created a Europe consisting of a coveted
West and an inferior East has a well-documented history. Taking Said’s (1980)
theory of orientalism as their starting point, scholars have traced how Eastern
Europe was ‘invented’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the region
came to be referenced as a whole and was ascribed properties that signified
Otherness and inferiority (Wolff, 1994). Although not technically colonies,
these countries ‘self-colonized’ themselves (Kiossev, 2000), adopting the
West’s orientalizing gaze and seeing their own region as inferior (Todorova,
1997). This moral geography continued to define the region’s repositioning
in Europe after 1989. According to the ruling transition narrative, Central
and Eastern Europe had been part of the West but experienced a temporary
throwback under Soviet-style socialism: moving spatially eastward and tem-
porally backward. Afterwards, the region would ‘return to’ the West and all it
entails, including market economy and liberal democracy (Smith, 2002), follow-
ing the developmental path of Western countries. The ‘East–West slope’ of
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development (Melegh, 2006) and catching up to Europe became central to the
local post-socialist political discourse.
This developmentalist narrative was foundational in the EU accession process
of Eastern European countries (Smith, 2002). The discourse of ‘Eastern enlar-
gement’ resonated with orientalism (Kuus, 2004). In the newly joining
countries, belonging to Europe became a ‘disciplining device used by hegemo-
nic actors to confer or deny legitimacy’ to local actors (Clark & Jones, 2011,
p. 296), fostered both by EU (Kuus, 2004) and local elites’ discursive strategies
in the 2004 accession wave (Clark & Jones, 2011; Moisio, 2007).
For the sociology of the future, these arguments are important because they
highlight the legacy of a specific temporal–spatial expectation practice in the
region, which charts the future of Eastern countries as ‘moving closer’ to the
Western states. We bring these theories to bear on the question of how actors
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) formed optimistic expectations and,
specifically, on the role played by the EU convergence narrative in the
process. Before we do that, however, we want to clarify the status of the
actual economic process of EU convergence in relation to the formation of
expectations.
What is imaginary about EU convergence?
While the central argument regarding orientalist developmental narratives is
that the East–West differences are socially constructed, EU convergence is
arguably everything but constructed. Accession to the European Union involves
the compulsory harmonization of legal frameworks, and Eurozone entry is tied
to a set of macroeconomic conditions known as the Maastricht criteria. The
European Union also has a broad set of regulatory measures as well as structural
and cohesion funds designed to facilitate convergence. Hence, the developmen-
tal narrative, suggesting that less developed countries will become similar to the
developed ones, is not just a metaphor but a programme that is actively pursued.
In this light, in what sense are expectations based on the EU convergence
process constructed or fictional? Are they not simply an acknowledgment of
the actual convergence process?
Not necessarily. Firstly, convergence is a contested question. While inter-
national governing bodies (from the IMF to the European Union) treat
Eastern Europe’s convergence as a fact – the only question being how soon
it will happen – scholars in the dependency school and world systems
theory argue that the European Union’s convergence measures do not lead
to the promised ‘catching up’ of ‘laggard’ economies. Rather, they cement
regional inequalities by enforcing neoliberal policy that benefits capital-rich
and established countries, and by putting in place economic structures that
channel profits from the semi-periphery countries of Eastern Europe to the
Western core (Becker et al., 2015; Böröcz, 2012; Dale, 2011; Gerőcs &
Pinkasz, 2018). In the context of finance, scholars have highlighted the
286 Economy and Society
uneven, ‘dependent financialization’ (Gal, 2015) of Eastern Europe. EU acces-
sion in 2004 accelerated deregulation and international privatization, leading to
the dominance of foreign-owned banks in post-socialist countries. Prior to the
mortgage crisis, these large banks supplemented their decreasing Western
European margins by lending in the lucrative Eastern markets, often in
foreign currency, repatriating large profits (Becker et al., 2015; Gal, 2015;
Raviv, 2008).5
Secondly, the European Union’s policy measures for convergence only refer
to certain elements of the economy, and mortgage debt is not one of these.
Macroeconomic criteria, legal harmonization and financial regulations do not
specify that mortgage institutions or market designs have to become similar.
Indeed, mortgage institutions and mortgage indebtedness show a wide variety
across Europe, which do not map onto GDP per capita differences (Schwartz
& Seabrooke, 2008). There is debate on whether mortgage markets will maintain
diversity, or converge – not in any programmatic way but due to the indirect
effect of the European Union’s liberalization policy (Fernandez & Aalbers,
2016). As this debate indicates, the question of how convergence policies will
affect local mortgage markets is contested, with no clear pathway to be
deduced from the ‘actual’ convergence process.
These points allow us to analyse the EU convergence narrative through the
theoretical lens of ‘fictional expectations’. While the EU convergence pro-
gramme is real, it does not mean that the future of the mortgage market is deter-
mined by it. It leaves ample room for different future scenarios. We use the term
‘imaginary futures’, constructed through symbolic ‘imaginary geographies’, to
reflect on these possibilities, which are not detached from the ongoing conver-
gence process, but represent different takes on its consequences and its future
trajectory.6
Research methods
The empirical data used in this paper were generated from a larger project that
traced the development of the Hungarian mortgage market from its design in
1996 until 2014, the end of its deepest crisis. The archival material consisted
of all parliamentary debates (referenced as PD, 1997–2014), laws and govern-
ment decrees (L&D, 2000–2011) related to mortgages, Reports on Financial
Stability issued by the Central Bank of Hungary (SR, 2000–2014), periodic
reports of the Hungarian Financial Services Authority (PSZÁF, 2000–2012),
annual reports of the Hungarian Banking Association (Bankszövetség, 2001–
2011), and reports issued by the Parliamentary investigative committee on
mortgage lending (PIC, 2012).
Complementing the documentary evidence, we carried out 40 expert inter-
views, including with key decision-makers in the Hungarian mortgage
market. Between them, 20 interviewees worked at banks in various mortgage-
related functions (product development, risk management, marketing, branch
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and bank management, etc.); seven at the Central Bank of Hungary; four at the
Financial Supervisory Authority and its predecessor; eight were employees of
the Ministry of National Economy and its predecessor, the Ministry of
Finance; four were Members of the Hungarian Parliament; and six were
other experts, including employees of the Economic Competition Authority,
real estate agents and mortgage lawyers. Interviews were anonymized. As inter-
viewees often worked at multiple banks and regulatory bodies over their careers,
indicating their consecutive workplaces would have made them identifiable;
therefore, we used multiple codes for every interviewee, each corresponding
to a different organization. For example, if someone worked at the Ministry
of Finance and then at a bank, that person received one code for the first and
another for the second period.
The data were analysed using discourse analysis (Tonkiss, 2004) in NVivo
with a focus on how actors formed optimistic expectations about the mortgage
market. Progressing from open coding to increasingly abstract categories, we
discerned several answers to this question. We established the validity of
these answers by checking our interpretations against the data and triangulating
within and between data sources.
In this paper, we explicate one theme that emerged as particularly rel-
evant to understanding the Central and Eastern European crisis. We do
not aim to account for all aspects of expectations; nor can we fully
explore here either dissent or why a particular narrative became dominant.
What we demonstrate is how the EU convergence narrative helped shape
expectations prior to the crisis.7
The development of the Hungarian Forex mortgage market
In 2002, variable-rate foreign-currency-denominated (Forex) mortgages
appeared in Hungary, offered at 6–8 per cent lower rates than forint mort-
gages (Király & Banai, 2014). By 2010, the total value of home mortgages
rose fourfold (Schepp & Pitz, 2012), due almost exclusively to Forex mort-
gages (Figure 1). By 2011, 15.2 per cent of households had a mortgage and
an additional 3.9 per cent a home equity loan (KSH, 2011), with 55 per cent
of the former and 82 per cent of the latter denominated in foreign currency
(Balas et al., 2015). A total of 88 per cent of Forex mortgages were denomi-
nated in Swiss francs (authors’ calculation based on data from MNB, 2011).
To lend out mortgages that run for 10–20 years, banks obtained short-
term funds from international money markets and from their foreign
parent banks (Banai et al., 2012). This short-term financing made the cost
at which funding could be renewed uncertain, as these costs depended on
the exchange rate, the foreign interest rate and on Hungary’s country
risk. Mortgage contracts delegated these risks entirely to borrowers, tying
the mortgage’s variable interest rate to the banks’ changing financing
costs (Schepp & Pitz, 2012).
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When the financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis led to con-
cerns about the US dollar and the euro, investors turned to the Swiss franc as a
safe currency. Increasing demand fuelled the franc’s appreciation, which was
coupled with decreased investor confidence in Central and Eastern European
markets. The forint was devalued, and Hungary’s country-risk premium rose,
resulting in elevated financing costs. These were relayed to borrowers, resulting
in a sharp increase of monthly mortgage instalments. By 2011, 28 per cent of
Forex mortgage and 43 per cent of Forex home equity borrowers were in
arrears, with 10 per cent and 18 per cent over the default threshold of three
months, respectively (authors’ calculations based on data from MNB, 2014).
Cartographies of the future
This disastrous scenario that eventually materialized was largely absent or dis-
missed as unlikely in expectations preceding the crisis. In what follows we show
the role of a spatialized set of expectations, governed by a convergence narrative,
in this dismissal. In the first step, we focus on how this narrative informed
expectations. We use Europe as an umbrella term for the diverse, overlapping
and often vague spatial narratives that posit a Western European or EU
region, or a single country as their endpoint. In the second step, we delve
into the heterogeneity and ambiguity surrounding actors’ conception of
Europe. We will use the term convergence narrative to describe the ways in
which actors referred to the ongoing EU and anticipated Eurozone accession
process in their expectations. The term developmentalist narrative will refer to
Figure 1 Household loan portfolio of the banking system 2000–2011
Source: Király & Banai (2014, p. 11).
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the orientalist Westernization narrative discussed earlier, which has a long
legacy in the region; while the term actual convergence process refers to the con-
crete steps involved in the EU and Eurozone accession.
How the spatialized convergence narrative precluded crisis expectations
One of the most important expectations that banks, regulators and policy-
makers formed was that over time the Hungarian mortgage debt level will
increase to those of Western countries. This belief, as one of our banker inter-
viewee recalls, was also widely held by foreign investors (S53):
Investors saw that Hungary’s indicators were below the indicators of Western-
European [countries]8… So externally, from a strategic point of view, bench-
marks and statistical methods showed that in Hungary the banking market is
about to grow massively.… So, this type of benchmark-based planning and
all, it really showed an enormous growth potential in mortgage lending. (S53)
Similar predictions were formulated by Central Bank analysts, comparing CEE
countries to Western Europe, and interpreting the difference as a sign of future
growth. Stability Reports noted that ‘Household debt ratio compared to the
GDP is lagging far behind the rates observable in countries of developed
market economies; this suggests the possibility of potential rising household
lending’ (SR, 2000/August). Reports concluded ‘great catching-up potential’
(SR, 2005/October) in the lending-to-GDP ratio (known as the ‘depth of finan-
cial mediation’) based on the fact that it was lower than in the EU-15 states.
Measures of differences in the present, such as country comparisons of debt-
to-GDP ratios, could be incorporated into expectations due to the assumption
that Hungary must converge to Europe over time, as these quotes illustrate. This
narrative referenced the ongoing EU accession process, yet also resonated with
the familiar developmentalist narrative of the region. It placed countries on a
continuum stretching from less developed to more developed ones and envi-
saged the future of Hungary as a movement towards its Western destination
along the developmental pathway.
The conflation of the convergence narrative with the developmentalist nar-
rative, as we will show in the following sections, played a central role in fore-
closing scenarios of the crisis to come. First, it framed growing indebtedness as
a sign of development, which can only be threatened by not being fast enough.
Second, it downplayed the Swiss franc currency risk by blurring differences
within Europe. Third, it excluded scenarios of a crisis originating in the West.
Growing indebtedness as catching up with Europe. One way in which the conver-
gence narrative foreclosed scenarios of the forthcoming crisis was through the
markedly developmentalist assumption that diminishing differences between
Hungary and Western Europe must, by definition, mean ‘development’. This
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assumption is surely tenable when applied to living standards; but less so when
it is extended to indebtedness, whose desirability is contestable. The concrete
ways in which this assumption informed expectations differed across regulators,
policymakers and banks, due to their different institutional expectation prac-
tices; yet they all shared this element.
Regulators’ key concern was whether to intervene in the growing mortgage
market. The Central Bank of Hungary, beyond its primary role of inflation tar-
geting, was responsible for financial stability. In theory, it could curb Forex
lending by setting higher compulsory reserve rates for these types of loans.
The stability question was whether mortgage growth was on an ‘equilibrium
path’ or experiencing an overheated boom. The facts of the actual convergence
process provided little guidance, partly because the question itself was norma-
tive rather than factual, and partly because convergence requirements did not
refer to mortgage lending. The answer to this question infused the convergence
narrative with the developmentalist narrative that posited an unquestioned
reference point: Western European countries’ indicators served as benchmarks
against which the normalcy of market development was measured. Convergence
to these indicators was seen as desirable, while divergence was interpreted as lin-
gering backwardness.
Through this lens, higher debt rates were consistently seen as the norm to be
emulated. Using a markedly developmentalist language, the Central Bank hailed
growing mortgage debt as a laudable sign of ‘catching up’ (SR, 2005/October),
decreasing Hungary’s ‘elmaradás’ (SR, 2003/June), which means lag, in the
sense of literally being left behind or being underdeveloped. Its opposite is ‘fel-
zárkózás’, which means catching up in the sense of a race or in development:
The mortgage boom of the last three years substantially decreased Hungary’s lag
(elmaradás) in household indebtedness…The [household] sector’s indebtedness
has substantially grown, the extent of the lag compared to the Eurozone has
decreased to one-third. (SR, 2004/June)
The net growth of the borrowing/consumption ratio can be considered a natural
phenomenon, which can be related to the catching-up ( felzárkózási) processes.
(SR, 2008/April)
Reflecting the spatial–temporal logic of the developmental narrative, the
2004/December Stability Report stated that ‘in the past years, the household
sector has gotten closer in terms of its indebtedness level to the level characteristic
of developed countries, measured as a ratio of income’. Diminishing difference
on given indicators meant moving closer to Europe.
The same spatial convergence-as-development narrative permeated the
Central Bank’s economic modelling, which aimed to assess if Hungary had a
credit boom, requiring intervention. A research paper that became crucial in
deciding this internal debate used data for the EU-15 countries between 1980
and 2002 and described how credit growth moved together with GDP
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growth, interest and inflation rates. The correlations observed in these countries
in the past were taken as the ‘equilibrium path’ for Hungary. Taking others’
pasts as the norm against which current CEE states were judged and their
optimal future predicted, the paper concluded that a ‘large part of the credit
growth in new member states can be explained by the catching-up process’
(Kiss et al., 2006, p. 4), even while noting that Hungarian household credit
growth exceeded the long-term equilibrium rate. The application of the devel-
opmentalist convergence narrative to debt measures made rapidly growing
indebtedness seem normal and desirable.9
In legislators’ projective work, Europe was used as the ultimate normative
argument in debates about the right course of action, by both of the major pol-
itical parties, the populist-conservative Fidesz and the neoliberal-socialist
MSZP (Magyar Szocialista Párt). The 2000–2001 mortgage subsidy pro-
gramme, introduced by Fidesz, was justified by the need to end the ‘untenable
situation’ that ‘while in Western-Europe, 85 per cent of a flat’s price is financed
by a mortgage, in this country the rate does not even reach 20 per cent’ (Sasvári
in PD, 1999). Similarly, Fidesz’s arguments between 2003 and 2009 in favour of
reintroducing mortgage subsidies were justified by people’s right to ‘procure
themselves with a European standard of life’ (Mádi in PD, 2004).
For banks, the convergence narrative was the fabric of benchmarks that were
based on the growth trajectory charted by selected European countries, as
several interviewees explained (S53, S63). With foreign banks owning 70 per
cent of the mortgage market in 2003 (Banai et al., 2011), benchmarks were set
mostly by Hungarian banks’ European (or in a few cases US) headquarters.
Benchmarks defined target results in management compensation, which trickled
down to sales plans and incentive programmes for branch managers and even
individual employees (S63). These targets put banks under strong ‘growth
pressure’, according to a risk analyst for the region at the international headquar-
ters of a major bank in Hungary (S54), while pressure to performmoved the sales
targets continually upward (S63). Bank competitionwasmost intense inHungary
and Poland, yet high local interest rates limited loan amounts and the range of
people that could afford them. Targets informed by Western European levels
were met only by introducing Forex loans which offered lower rates.
By focusing on the measurement of ‘catching-up’, the convergence narrative
excluded scenarios that would achieve the developmental targets quantitatively
while creating other problems, such as modifying the product qualitatively – to
being denominated in another currency – in an effort to reach the expected
levels. This excluded the possibility of crises that might happen in spite of,
or even because of, catching up with European debt levels.
Homogeneous Europe: downplaying the risks of Forex lending. The convergence
narrative desensitized market participants not only to the risks of growing
debt, but also to those of foreign-currency lending. Regulators, legislators and
banks formed the concrete expectation that Hungary will join the Eurozone
in the medium term, eliminating the euro–forint currency risk:
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In 2004, looking forward, everybody said that, oh, wow, we have joined the EU.
We are going straight ahead, there is no risk in it [in Forex mortgages]. And the
communication was that we will join the Eurozone a few years after the accession,
in 2008. If we join, then the risk gets eliminated. (S65, banker, board member of
the Banking Association)
In 2004–2005, the EUprospects were very positive. At the time, there was even an
eventuality of joining the Eurozone with an even stronger forint. And there were
opinions – which sound nonsense today but did not back then – that maybe those
who get indebted in forint will be worse off, because if the forint gets stronger, the
Forex borrowers will be better off. (S13, Financial Supervisory Authority)
After 2006, however, the official target date for joining the Eurozone was post-
poned to an unspecified future date, and key economic indicators started to
diverge further from the Maastricht criteria. Yet market-wide optimism
remained:
If you believe that there is convergence – and you had to be very pessimistic to
say that there won’t be convergence, in 2007, three years after EU accession –
then it explains quite well why people took them out [Forex mortgages].
(S4, senior official at the Central Bank)
As a key mortgage banker (S65) summarized: ‘We were lending on hopes’.
Most Forex mortgages, however, were not denominated in euro, but in Swiss
franc. Popular reasoning of the time suggested that the franc–euro exchange
rate historically showed little volatility, hence it will stay stable in the future
(S3, S59, PB, PIC). As the euro historical rates only went back as far as the
euro’s introduction in 1999, central bankers and banks substituted Deutsche
Mark rates for earlier periods (S65). These calculations, following the symbolic
cartography of the developmentalist narrative, assumed that Western Europe’s
regions and countries were relatively interchangeable. As Zsigmond Járai,
Central Bank Governor 2001–2007 recalled:
at the time the expectation was that the CHF-HUF exchange rate risk would be
present for only a few years and then we will grow into the Eurozone; and after
that the CHF-EUR exchange rate risk would be present, which, how can I put it,
is logically substantially smaller. (PIC 2012)
Assumptions of interchangeability of the euro and franc were disproven as
the Swiss franc appreciated due to its ‘safe haven’ status during the global finan-
cial crisis. In fact, the assumption did not fully hold even before the crisis. The
franc had been widely used as a carry-trade currency, also in Western Europe.
Due to low franc interest rates, traders borrowed in franc to invest in higher-rate
currencies. But the Central Bank of Hungary only saw danger in other carry-
trade currencies. A 2008/April Stability Report warned of the volatility of ‘Japa-
nese yen compared to the Swiss franc and the euro’, due to the ‘carry trade’ and
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the lack of ‘strong links between the fundamentals of the Japanese and the Euro-
pean economies’. The Swiss franc, in contrast, was not in question due to the
supposedly integrated fundamentals of the European Union and the Swiss
economy. However, during the global financial crisis, these assumptions
turned out to be inaccurate: exchange rates deviated between the euro and
the franc, and even more between the franc and the forint.
Foreclosing a crisis from the West. Albeit actors at times lamented a potential
forint depreciation, the normative logic of the convergence narrative excluded
the possibility that its cause might originate in the West. Political and regulatory
discourse pictured the West – which included everybody from Merrill Lynch
analysts to ‘international investors’ and Western governments – as the watchful
guardian of the Hungarian economy, responding with immediate punishment
and the withdrawal of trust to every wrong move, leading to forint depreciation.
‘Wrong moves’ that Hungary might make were imagined as a wide range of mis-
takes: passing a law that is not up to ‘European standards’, the prime minister
making a pessimistic remark about the future or irresponsible budget planning
(PD 1997–2007). The other side of this image was a West that rewarded good
behaviour, including the provision of financial assistance in case of crisis. A
Ministry of Finance employee explained the political thinking of the time:
‘We are good boys, we are in a good relationship with everyone. If things go
tits-up, Germany will sort it out’ (S28).
Consequently, all crisis scenarios started from the assumption that the source
of potential problems could only be Hungary’s inability to stick to the conver-
gence path due to its own mistakes. This excluded the possibility of a crisis ema-
nating from the mistakes or even actions of Western actors; and even more, a
crisis that would hit Western countries so hard that they would struggle to
‘sort out’ their own economies, let alone Hungary’s.
Spatializing the future: racing to development and keeping up with the peers
Convergence formulated as ‘catching up’ raised additional questions that bore on
expectations: is convergence happening at the expected speed and along the right
developmentalmilestones? Themetaphor of the East–West slope (Melegh, 2006)
does not do justice to the complexity of this orientation exercise. The question
was not simply whether Hungary was moving up or sliding down. Rather, as if
in an orienteering competition without a map, it probed whether Hungary was
on a West-bound pathway or in a dead-end; and whether their speed, relative
to the others in the catching-up race, was fast enough to keep an elite position.
In search of answers, expectations drew on another realm in the symbolic carto-
graphy: the peer ‘region’. For Hungary, this was defined originally as the Visegrád
Countries of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The Visegrád
Group was formed in 1991 with the aim of ‘overcoming the division of Europe
imposed after World War II and facilitating the integration of our countries into
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the European and Euro-Atlantic structures’ (Visegrad Group, 2011). The Group
has successfully claimed the lead-pack position in the catching-up race, being
seen as the most developed, Western-oriented countries in the former Eastern
Bloc. It distinguished itself from the rest of Eastern Europe, which it saw as back-
ward, as the real East. As a high-ranking Central Bank official (S3) put it:
The peer countries were always the Visegrád Four. All the international com-
parisons you saw always compared the Visegrád Four to each other. This
other, um, Eastern stuff or whatever, did not interest us. (S3)
Hungary’s convergence speed benchmarked to this specific region was tracked
by statistics comparing Hungary to the ‘region’ both internally and externally,
by the OECD and the IMF (see Figure 2). For example, the 2004/June Stab-
ility Report stated that although ‘the size of the Hungarian banking system
shows a substantial lag in comparison to the EU… it compares favourably
within the region’ and rejoiced that ‘the depth of our country’s banking
system, measured by household lending, has exceeded the region’s average’,
noting the slowdown of close peers Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Constant comparisons in the developmental race focused on maintaining
Hungary’s position in this elite league. Slow-down in the growth of
Figure 2 GDP convergence in the European Union
Source: OECD table illustrating Hungary’s ‘slowdown in the convergence process [to the
Western EU members], both in absolute and relative to its neighbouring countries’
(OECD, 2008, p. 11).
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indebtedness meant lagging within the group – or worse, losing one’s elite-
league status. This is indeed what happened after the mortgage crisis, when
Hungary’s GDP growth decelerated: Romania and Bulgaria were added to
the reference region. As the same interviewee (S3) noted bitterly, ‘And it is
not by accident that Romania and Bulgaria came in. And it is just a good
pretext that they are EU members now’. The fact that Hungary became
grouped with countries that in the symbolic cartography belonged to the
despised ‘Eastern stuff’ was clearly interpreted by this leading central banker
as the loss of Hungary’s elite status. The term pretext indicates that the real
reason was that Hungary could not maintain its relative advance.
These comparisons of speed further contributed to locating potential risks in
the inability to catch up quickly enough, precluding discussions about how
much debt is desirable. Besides becoming a speedometer, the ‘region’ also
guided expectations as to whether Hungary was on the right path, thereby
further dispelling doubts about the risks of Forex mortgages. The ‘region’
was used to judge whether a given phenomenon was an anomaly or just a
stage of the convergence process, helping decision-makers clue in to risks.
The 2004/December Stability Report compared Forex lending in the ‘CEE
catching up countries’ and concluded reassuringly that ‘in terms of the ratio
of Forex loans within household loans, Hungary is in the middle range… the
24 per cent cannot be considered incongruous in a field spreading from 0 to
67 per cent’. Forex lending was identified as a ‘characteristic of catching-up
countries’ (SR 2004/December), since the higher risk premium that corre-
sponded to a country’s catching-up status invited the provision of lower-rate
loans such as those offered in Swiss franc. Forex lending was seen as a tempor-
ary phenomenon, a stage of a journey that other converging countries were also
passing through on their way to Europe.
Finally, the ‘region’ allowed for dispelling doubts when certain indicators
showed a persistent ‘lag’. One of these were house prices, which were essential
for expectations regarding the future value of real-estate collateral. As a risk
analyst (S54) recalls, ‘real-estate prices were one of our most important stat-
istics. We were gauging them because the price, the real-estate price index, is
an important factor’. Local real-estate prices, however, showed a decline in
real terms (FHB, quoted in MNB, 2011). In interpreting these data, analysts
relied on real-estate price trends in the peer region, where prices showed an
ascending trend. Hence, analysts concluded that Hungary has not reached
the growth stage yet, using peer performance as a proxy for Hungary’s short-
term future. This allowed for the formation of expectations of an imminent
upward trend, based on data showing a downward trend (S54).
Dilemmas of spatial pathways
In the previous section, we showed how spatialized expectations, imagined and
measured as movement through a symbolic space towards an idealized Europe,
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along reference points marked by peers, foreclosed the scenario of the crisis to
come. In this section, we show why we consider this space ‘symbolic’ despite
its evident reference to real locations, economic geographical characteristics
and to the EU convergence process. As we explained above, the convergence
process did not specify targets for mortgage debt levels, and defining the ‘EU
level’ was complicated by the fact that mortgage-to-GDP ratios widely differed
across the EU countries (Schwartz & Seabrooke, 2008). This means that the
future of the mortgage market could not be deduced from actual and
planned convergence steps in any straightforward way. Rather, actors laboured
to identify and effectively construct endpoints and trajectories, by selectively
drawing on the data available and creating linkages from that data to the
future.
We illustrate this process by showing the diversity of trajectories in use: some
leading first through the Southern European countries to a more advanced
Western core; others leading through the more recently joined to the oldest
member states; yet others through the small EU countries; or envisaging a
straight line along which Hungary was to move towards the EU average. We
will suggest that although the logic of constructing the pathways referenced
the actual convergence process, it often invoked the developmentalist Wester-
nization narrative. Rather than setting concrete targets, pathways customarily
used a fluid notion of Europe extending beyond the European Union and mobi-
lized the logic of the GDP-based developmental path, even though mortgage
debt did not follow differences in GDP.
Uncertain endpoints and trajectories
Not having been handed clear-cut future scenarios of convergence, it is not an
exaggeration to say that participants in the Hungarian mortgage market were
looking around for the future. They charted a variety of pathways along
countries chosen by diverse selection logics. One possible trajectory led
through the path of Southern European countries, then eventually to
Western European ones (see Figure 3).
As a banker explained, when assessing Hungary’s debt levels to define short-
term benchmarks, investors looked at mortgage lending indicators of
Central-Western European economies… those of other countries that we can
use as an analogy, like Portugal, Spain. So, I don’t mean the most advanced
ones like the Anglo-Saxon countries, the Netherlands or Sweden; but the ones
that were two steps ahead of us, which we usually used as reference points or
benchmarks for Hungary and the Eastern markets. (S53)
The term Central-Western invokes an imaginary cartography, in which these
countries are not in Southern Europe, but in-between Hungary and the real
West, on Hungary’s westward path. Given that the topic is mortgage debt,
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we would expect that they are in-between in terms of mortgage levels, situated
between countries with low mortgage levels (Hungary) and countries with high
levels (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden). Yet, it is not the
case. In the early 2000s, the period to which the quote refers, mortgage levels
did not follow a North–South division. While Italy and Greece had some of
the lowest mortgage-to-GDP ratios (11.5 per cent and 15.5 per cent to
GDP), Spain (40 per cent) and especially Portugal (46.3 per cent) had relatively
high ratios, higher than Ireland (42.3 per cent), France (24.3 per cent), Belgium
(29.5 per cent), Austria (17.7 per cent) and Finland (24.8 per cent), in fact more
similar to Germany (53.5 per cent), Sweden (52.5 per cent) and Norway (52 per
cent) (European Mortgage Federation, 2003, p. 89; see Figure 4). The cartogra-
phy referenced by the interviewee thus selectively rearranged countries, moving
Spain and Portugal into the low-mortgage-ratio group. This suggests that its
underlying logic was ranking by GDP (see Figure 5). In light of the fact that
GDP levels did not correlate with mortgage debt, the use of GDP-ranking
suggests that the conventional, developmentalist narrative informed this
trajectory.
Figure 3 The Southern pathway
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Other trajectories identified country size among the relevant aspects of
choosing destination countries that would illuminate Hungary’s future. This
pathway was charted through the past of the ‘small converging countries’
within the European Union, by analysing the ‘accession experiences… of the
small converging countries, such as Ireland and Portugal’ (SR, 2002/Decem-
ber). It is telling that although Denmark and Austria both have smaller popu-
lations than Portugal, their convergence experiences were not seen as
exemplary. This is because the examples chosen for Hungarian market actors
actually referred to low-GDP countries (at the time of joining, for Ireland),
informed by the GDP-based developmental logic.
The most common trajectory, however, was linear, leading to the European
Union en bloc (see Figure 6). The European Union, similarly to the West of the
Westernization narrative, was not one thing, but could symbolize diverse ideas
for actors. The European Union was referred to as the ‘EU countries’ (e.g. SR,
2002/December), ‘the Eurozone’ (e.g. SR, 2006/April), the ‘developed Euro-
pean countries’ (e.g. SR, 2002/June), ‘developed countries’ (e.g. SR, 2002/
Figure 4 Total outstanding residential loans to GDP ratio, 2003
Source: Based on data from the European Mortgage Federation (2003, p. 89).
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June and December), ‘countries of developed market economy’ (SR, 2000/
August)’ or plainly as ‘Western Europe’ (SR, 2004/June), used as synonyms
in the same text. Western European but non-EU countries, such as Norway,
were often included when charting a potential convergence trajectory, and all
EU-15 countries were customarily referred to as ‘the Eurozone’, even though
Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom are not members (e.g. SR,
2004/June). Economists at the Central Bank and other market actors were
aware that not all Western European countries are EU members and not all
EU-15 countries are in the Eurozone. Yet, these distinctions seemed to be
unimportant details in forming their expectations, because they all referenced
the same entity of the developed Europe.
What exactly would the destination defined more closely as the ‘European
Union’ look like? This was also unclear: some reports used the EU average of
the chosen metric; others the ‘typical’ EU indicators; yet others suggested
that all Western European countries carried the essence of the European
Union. This is reflected in the strategy, used particularly by legislators, of refer-
ring to the example of a Western country such as the United Kingdom,
Figure 5 GDP-per-capita in 2003 in PPS, EU25 = 100
Source: Based on data from Eurostat (2004).
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Denmark or Germany, when arguing for a particular direction Hungary’s future
should take (PD 1997–2007). Customarily, there was no reason given as to the
choice of that country; it served to reference the larger idea of the ‘West’ and
thereby confer legitimacy on one’s argument. As European countries are
diverse, it was convenient to find a Western example of any political proposition
and its opposite.
The diversity of pathways highlights the interpretative element in construct-
ing trajectories, by drawing selectively on the actual and desired convergence
process. This interpretative openness allowed for sharing the convergence nar-
rative across different actors and expectation practices. By being able to accom-
modate a variety of pathways, the convergence narrative became a ‘boundary
object’ (Star & Griesemer, 1989), lending itself to radically different interpret-
ations and contexts. Despite their differences, ambiguities and inconsistencies,
however, these trajectories were not as different as to be contradictory. They all
referenced, in one way or another, a westward movement.
Ambivalence played an important role in dismissing information that
questioned the development process. Over time, the different indicators
Figure 6 Moving towards ‘Europe’
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used for monitoring the state of ‘catching up’ showed an increasingly mixed
picture. While debt-to-GDP ratios were still below the Western level,
households’ debt-to-income ratios exceeded it. As a central banker
remembers:
Financial deepening refers to a standpoint that, to some extent, it is normal for
the population to become indebted. If you look at half of the Eurozone, you see
that household debt is at 60–70 per cent of the GDP. If you look at Hungary, you
can see that it is still at 30 per cent.…At the CBH when we analysed household
debt specifically, we said ok, if we look at debt/GDP ratios there is great Hun-
garian lag. But if we look at household indebtedness, there is no lag. (S4)
This became a topic of internal discussions in the CBH, revolving around the
correct interpretation of data (S3, S4): as laudable catching up or as overshoot-
ing the target and resulting in over-indebtedness. Even the 2008/April Stability
Report stated that although ‘the 28 per cent of Hungarian household debt-to-
GDP ratio is still substantially lagging behind the 55 per cent characteristic
of the Eurozone… the 33 per cent financial liabilities-to-financial wealth ratio
is already above the 27 per cent reference level’ and the ‘13 per cent repay-
ment-to-income burden of the household sector… is higher than the 10–11
per cent of the Eurozone’.
The report resolved the problem by pointing out that ‘beside the average
value, large differences exist among the member states, hence there are
countries where the repayment-to-income burden is twice as high as in
Hungary’ (SR, 2008/April). Switching to a different yet compatible interpret-
ation of the European Union, marked not by the EU-average, but by particular
EU countries, allowed for smoothing the inconsistency without undermining
the convergence narrative. In this way, the indeterminacy of the convergence
pathway made it possible to sustain the narrative by flexibly adjusting what
was meant by the ‘European Union’ and by re-routing trajectories to fit the con-
vergence ideal.
Conclusion
Starting from a reflection that existing accounts focusing on ‘knowledge failures’
to foresee the financial crisis are not adequate to understand the broader set of
‘simpler crises’, this paper looked at the formation of expectations in the Hun-
garian Forex mortgage market prior to its crisis, between 2002 and 2008. By
focusing on Eastern Europe, we have begun to unpack the varied ways in
which countries outside the Western core jumped on the optimistic bandwagon.
Based on these findings, we propose the concept of spatializing the future as a
means of legitimizing, stabilizing and sharing expectations across actors. We
detail these contributions below.
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Knowledge failures in the semi-periphery
Our analysis highlighted the central role of the EU convergence narrative in
why key institutional actors did not seriously consider scenarios of a Hungarian
mortgage crisis, which eventually materialized. As in all narratives, it allowed for
envisioning certain crisis scenarios while precluding others. First, the conver-
gence narrative depicted growing indebtedness as a sign of the desirable catch-
ing-up process in relation to Europe. The preoccupation with the problem of
how to grow until Hungary reaches EU mortgage levels led banks and their reg-
ulators to welcome Swiss franc mortgages and concentrate on their beneficial
effect of closing the debt gap, attending less to the risks of rising household
indebtedness and of potential exchange rate changes. Secondly, the narrative
dispelled concerns that the Hungarian currency would be drastically devalued
relative to the Swiss franc, through the expectation of Hungary’s convergence
to the economic fundamentals of a homogeneous Europe. Finally, it foreclosed
crisis scenarios originating in the same, superior Europe.
The convergence narrative, imbued with orientalizing notions of inferiority and
progress, disregarded the possibility of economic diversity as well as ofmutual con-
vergence. Although the term convergencemeans ‘to come together’, actors did not
entertain the idea that the European Union could be an amalgam of old and new
countries, even after Hungary’s entry into the Union in 2004. Rather, reflecting
theWesternization imaginary, convergencewasunderstood as a one-sided catching
up to the standards set by the old member states, even in cases where an argument
could be made in favour of ‘lower’ standards, e.g. in levels of indebtedness.
The convergence narrative, we argued, albeit referencing the concrete EU and
Eurozone convergence process, cannot be reduced to a simple acknowledgment
of the objective reality of this process. The convergence process was uncertain not
only in the sense ofwhen an otherwise fixed set of eventswould happen, but also in
what exactly would and should happen. Facts of the actual convergence process
were insufficient to form expectations, partly because the process did not
involve targets for themortgagemarket, and partly because existing EU countries
showed large institutional variety and varied indebtedness levels.
Our paper showed how this uncertainty was resolved, at least partly, by
fusing the convergence narrative with the older developmentalist narrative.
The latter filled in the gaps left by the uncertainties of the convergence
process and allowed for trajectories to be drawn into an otherwise uncertain
future. Importantly, it acted as a powerful legitimizing and doubt-repelling
force (Chong & Tuckett, 2015) by linking convergence to the long-coveted
membership in the West.
Spatializing the future
Returning to the question of how expectations are formed and maintained in the
economy, our study not only confirms the centrality of narratives in this process
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(Beckert, 2013b, 2016; Czarniawska, 1997; Esposito, 2011; Mützel, 2013), but
also identifies the spatial dimension of working out the future. The spatialization
of the future is a practice of forming expectations that translates temporal change
(typically growth) into spatial movement, depicting future events as positions
along a trajectory – in certain cases, leading through and towards concrete geo-
graphical locations. These practices ‘defuturize’ in Luhmann’s sense by trans-
posing the problem of time into a problem of space – of distance, speed and
being on track.
In our case from Eastern Europe, expectations were stabilized by a European
convergence narrative which was embedded in a cartography, through which a
spatial trajectory could be charted from Hungary to an idealized destination, the
European Union. This cartography was populated with Western European des-
tinations and milestones along the path, as well as with countries in Hungary’s
peer region whose position helped to establish whether Hungary was on the
right track and moving at the right speed. Albeit referencing real geographical
places, the manner in which these places were selected and causally linked into a
trajectory of Hungary’s future was deeply interpretative. Actors charted diverse
pathways by drawing selectively on the actual and presumed economic facts of
convergence. This selection was often informed by the developmentalist carto-
graphy. In this sense, it was a symbolic space, akin to Said’s (1980) ‘imagined
geographies’ (p. 49).
Spatializing techniques provide additional insight into how certain future
scenarios are legitimized and maintained despite counter-evidence. Emotions
(Chong & Tuckett, 2015), self-representations (Boccara, 2014), institutional
frames and interests (Abolafia, 2010; Davies & McGoey, 2012) undoubtedly
play a role in maintaining particular narratives of the future – and did in our
case, too. Indeed, the convergence narrative came to dominate and withstand
counter-evidence, in great part because Europe had been a ‘phantastic object’
(Chong & Tuckett, 2015; Tuckett et al., 2014). As such, it tapped into Hun-
gary’s idealized self-representation (Boccara, 2014) as a Westernizing nation –
as well as coinciding with actors’ specific interests: profitability for banks and
political gains for policymakers.
Yet, spatializing practices have an additional aspect that allows them to main-
tain and dispense expectations over time, which is not captured by these expla-
nations: their seeming matter-of-factness. They translate abstract concepts into
a spatial movement, something externally projected, trackable and verifiable –
most notably in geographical space. This transforms uncertain futures into see-
mingly certain pathways by granting them a natural, taken-for-granted, even
reified character.
Spatializing practices also help us understand how particular expectations
come to be shared across diverse institutional actors. This sharing, leading to
‘regulatory monocultures’ (Bronk & Jacoby, 2016) or ‘epistemic communities’
(Engelen et al., 2012), has been seen as central to many prediction failures.
While seemingly concrete, spatialized futures facilitate sharing if they remain
underspecified and ambiguous. Referencing a specific direction, rather than a
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single trajectory, allows them to act as a ‘boundary object’ (Star & Griesemer,
1989) that can be adjusted to actors’ different existing expectation practices,
as in Hungary’s case. The underspecified westward movement to Europe pro-
vided a shared reference point across key actors, from the vague Western ideals
alluded to in Parliament, to the meticulous statistical scenarios of the Central
Bank and to banks’ benchmarks, allowing for a relatively shared expectation
of a prosperous future path (see also Vargha, 2010). While actors used different
forms of predictions, choosing what parameters and data to include, and evalu-
ating the calculated results, relied on a shared spatial narrative.
We can extend these insights on geographical spatializing expectation prac-
tices beyond the financial crisis. Geographers and sociologists of finance show
that new geography-based investment categories such as ‘emerging markets’
(O’Tuathail, 1997; Sidaway & Pryke, 2000), ‘Asian emerging markets’ (Lai,
2006) or ‘BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) (Wansleben,
2013) are not objective givens but created discursively by the ‘re-scripting of
global spaces’ through ‘geographically imagined and socially constructed pro-
cesses’ (Sidaway & Pryke, 2000, p. 197; see also Lee, 2003). Examining these
processes through the lens of expectation-formation, we can identify a similar
spatialized practice at play: countries are grouped into ‘regions’ based on
shared prospects, whether promising (BRICs) or gloomy (of the ‘PIGS’ of Por-
tugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain). It is the anchoring in concrete geography that
makes these prospects stable and credible.
Yet, our arguments on spatializing expectation practices apply beyond the
geographical understanding of space. Trajectory can be charted through a math-
ematical space of laying out expected values over time in a graph, such as that of
stock performance (Preda, 2007) or treasury bond yields (Zaloom, 2009). Simi-
larly, studies of accounting change, technological innovation and strategic plan-
ning have highlighted actors’ efforts to rely on spatial metaphors that can
summon a path, if not a destination, on which innovation or strategy will lead
actors, most notably the ‘road map’. These may convene a new market
around themselves (Miller & Leary, 2007; Sydow et al., 2012) or lead an organ-
ization from the present through steps towards reaching the strategic objective
(Ezzamel et al., 2004; Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 2015). For strategic planning, the
imaginary space is filled with competitors to distinguish from and surpass. Such
a competitive space might be constructed by third parties, such as market
research firms or investment analysts, which create ranking dimensions to pos-
ition and perform the evolving or novel ‘market’ (Pollock & D’Adderio, 2012).
Spatializing the future is one of many possible ways in which expectation nar-
ratives are legitimized (see Beckert, 2016). This raises a further direction for
research: to understand why spatial narratives are more relevant in some settings
than in others. Why, for instance, is spatializing the future a much more salient
practice in the semi-peripheral region than in the core Western countries?
Indeed, spatial aspects may inform expectations more generally, depending
on actors’ ‘location’. While from the vantage point of countries designated as
non-Western, emerging or developing, expectations would be explicitly
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formulated as progression through space, from the viewpoint of countries con-
sidered as core, such spatialization might be present as the assumption of taken-
for-granted, central positions – this is suggested by the relative absence of space
in these markets’ narratives. If previous studies were right in focusing predomi-
nantly on temporal aspects of expectations, we may now ask why there would be
a lack of spatializing the future in certain settings, and with what consequences.
The absence of space and awareness of one’s own position may indeed be a key
element of the scenarios these de-spatialized narratives allow for.
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Notes
1 Calculation for a typical Swiss franc (CHF) mortgage (10 million HUF, 20-year
maturity, acquired between 2005 and 2008), using Central Bank of Hungary (CBH) stat-
istics on average interest rates and monthly average exchange rates to estimate changes in
monthly instalments.
2 This scenario did not apply equally to all Eastern European countries, due to differ-
ences in the level of household debt and the proportion of Forex mortgages within it,
exchange rate policy (e.g. floating versus fixed) and policy responses to the crisis. The
countries that were hit hardest were Hungary, Poland, the Baltic States, Bulgaria,
Romania and Ukraine, while Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic experienced
fewer problems (Bohle, 2014; Dübel & Walley, 2010; Marer, 2010; PFS Advisory
Team, 2012; Yesi̧n, 2013).
3 For a related discussion on decision-making under conditions of uncertainty see
Gigerenzer (2016) and Savage (1972).
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4 Expectations about the future behaviour of ‘themarket’ have been studied as part of col-
lective practices of knowledge-production, performed through specific technologies (e.g. the
notion of a ‘scoping system’ and ‘flow market’ (Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2007). In this litera-
ture, however, imagining the future was not theorized as a core form of market action.
5 Economists agree, but see it as a temporary feature (see, for example, Banai et al.,
2011).
6 For a discussion of how these relate to the social construction of geographical invest-
ment regions, see our Conclusion.
7 For an analysis of power struggles across actors see Pellandini-Simányi et al. (2015).
8 Squared brackets are our additions; round brackets are alternative translations. Italics
are added emphasis.
9 As noted above, we do not claim that the convergence narrative was the only reason
why the CBH did not intervene. Financial stability, guarded by the CBH, could be
equally threatened by an economic slowdown as by a credit boom. House-building
was a significant part of GDP growth; hence, the question became whether risky borrow-
ing or slow GDP growth was more dangerous. Between 2006 and 2010, slackening GDP
growth appeared to be the bigger danger to convergence than the possibility of a mort-
gage crisis. This and other explanations are not discussed in the paper because our aim is
to analyse the role of the convergence narrative in downplaying the crisis scenario, rather
than a full review of expectations.
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költségek, romló életszínvonal? Mit tesz
azért a kormány, hogy ne így legyen?,
05.04.2004.
L&D. (2000–2011). Laws and decrees
related to mortgages in the period under
study. Retrieved from magyarkozlony.hu.
SR. (2000–2014). Financial Stability




PSZÁF. (2000–2012). Periodic reports of








reports of the Hungarian Banking
Association. Retrieved from http://www.
bankszovetseg.hu/informacio/jelentesek.
PIC. (2012). Parlamenti Bizottság a 2002-
2010 közötti lakossági deviza-eladósodás
okainak feltárásáról, valamint az esetleges
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